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NO FRACKNATION WITHOUT 
REPRESENTATION: STRIPPING AWAY A 
CITY’S RIGHT TO REGULATE THE STRIPPING 
AWAY OF ITS NATURAL RESOURCES IN STATE 
EX REL. MORRISON v. BECK ENERGY CORP. 
DEREK ROCHA* 
Abstract: In 2011, the city of Munroe Falls, Ohio sought to prevent Beck En-
ergy Corporation from drilling for gas or oil within its city limits until the 
company complied with the city’s relevant municipal ordinances. Pursuant 
cases sought to resolve whether Munroe Falls’ municipal ordinances were a 
valid exercise of the city’s home-rule power. The Ohio Supreme Court deter-
mined that the local ordinances conflicted with state law, which regulated oil 
and gas production within Ohio. The court held that the state law preempted 
the local ordinances as they sought to regulate oil and gas production in a sim-
ilar manner. In response, the concurring and dissenting opinions expressed 
concern that the plurality opinion demonstrated a rigid deference towards 
preemption at the expense of traditionally recognized areas of municipal au-
thority. This Comment argues in favor of the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, which rightly cautioned against the preemption of all local regulations 
by state law when dealing with ultrahazardous and locally impactful activity. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Beck Energy Corporation (“Beck Energy”) is an Ohio-based oil 
and natural gas company that secured a permit from the Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources (“ODNR”) Mineral Resources Management Division to 
drill a well on Joseph Willingham’s property located in the city of Munroe 
Falls.1 Beck Energy received a permit pursuant to the conditions outlined in 
Ohio’s Revised Code (“R.C.”) Chapter 1509, which regulates oil and gas 
wells and production operations within Ohio.2 Beck Energy, however, re-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2015–2016. 
 1 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp. (Beck I), 989 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
The ODNR is the administrative department charged with maintaining and regulating the use of 
Ohio’s natural resources, such as: minerals, state parks, nature preserves, wildlife areas, forests, wa-
terways, and the exploitation of such. See History and Purpose of the Department of Natural Re-
sources, OHIO DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://ohiodnr.gov/home/history-purpose [https://perma.cc/
P393-N8VF]. 
 2 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp. (Beck II), 37 N.E.3d 128, 131 (Ohio 2015). 
R.C. chapter 1509.02 provides that the ODNR and, more specifically, it’s Mineral Resources 
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fused to comply with the necessary Munroe Falls municipal ordinances be-
fore drilling within the city limits.3 The City of Munroe Falls issued a Stop 
Work Order and sought a permanent injunction that would prohibit Beck 
Energy from drilling within the city until the energy company complied 
with the city’s municipal regulations.4 
Beck Energy opposed the injunction, asserting that the Munroe Falls 
ordinances were unenforceable because they conflicted with Ohio’s com-
prehensive oil and gas regulatory scheme, as embodied in R.C. Chap-
ter 1509.5 In obtaining the state permit, Beck Energy met a total of sixty-
seven required conditions relating to site distribution, pit construction, 
waste disposal, noise mitigation, and appropriate notice to surrounding 
property owners.6 Munroe Falls’ municipal ordinances addressed similar 
considerations and consequently required Beck Energy to undergo a repeti-
tive and parallel permitting process.7 In contesting compliance with the or-
dinances, Beck Energy argued that these ordinances were not only redun-
dant, but also violated Ohio’s Home Rule Amendment.8 Munroe Falls justi-
fied the enforcement of both its ordinances and the subsequent injunction as 
a valid exercise of its home-rule authority.9 Under this doctrine, a city has 
                                                                                                                           
Management Division, has “sole and exclusive authority to regulate the permitting, location, and 
spacing of oil and gas wells and production operation” within Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1509.02 (West 2013); see also Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 89. The purpose of R.C. chapter 1509.02, 
as amended in 2004, is to provide “uniform statewide regulation” of oil and gas production within 
Ohio, and to repeal “all provisions of law that granted or alluded to the authority of local govern-
ments to adopt concurrent requirements with the state.” Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 131 (quoting Sub. 
H.B. No. 278, 125th Gen Assemb. (Ohio 2004)). 
 3 Brief for Appellant at 1, State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128 (Ohio 
2015) (No. 2013-0465), 2013 WL 5229893, at *1. 
 4 Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 88; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at *1. 
 5 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 133; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02; supra note 2 and 
accompanying text. 
 6 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 132. 
 7 Id. at 138 (O’Donnell, J., concurring). Before drilling, Beck Energy would have had to re-
ceive various approvals from the municipal planning commission, the city council, the zoning 
inspector, and the board of zoning appeals. Id. at 132–33. Beck Energy then would have had to 
file for a “conditional zoning certificate” for a period of one year, pay a fee of $800 and deposit 
$2000 for a performance bond at the time of filing, and then schedule a public hearing at least 
three weeks prior to drilling and notify all property owners and residents within 1000 feet of the 
drilling location. Id. 
 8 Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 89–90. The Home Rule Amendment is a constitutional power granted 
to municipalities so that they may exercise all powers of local self-government on all matters that 
are strictly local in nature, provided that the exercise thereof does not conflict with a general state 
law. Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 133; see also OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. A conflict exists if “the 
ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.” Beck II, 
37 N.E.3d at 135 (quoting Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519 (1923)). 
 9 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 133. 
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the power to implement local ordinances that supplement, rather than con-
flict with, general state law.10 
The Court of Common Pleas in Summit County initially granted in-
junctive relief that prohibited Beck Energy from drilling until it complied 
with all local ordinances.11 Upon review, however, the Ninth District Court 
of Appeals held that five of Munroe Falls’ municipal ordinances conflicted 
with state general law; the court reversed the lower court’s injunction as it 
related to these five ordinances.12 In a plurality opinion written by Justice 
Judith L. French, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals de-
cision and held that these ordinances violated Ohio’s Home Rule Amend-
ment, leaving them preempted by the existing state laws.13 
Part I of this Comment outlines the factual and procedural history as 
well as relevant legal considerations in Beck. Part II discusses and compares 
the plurality’s holding that state drilling and fracking laws preempted local 
regulations, with the concurring and dissenting opinions, which advocated 
for preserving a municipality’s ability to regulate locally impactful activity 
when at all possible. Part III advocates for the dissent’s reluctance in cur-
tailing home-rule authority in cases that have a significant bearing on the 
interests of a municipality’s residents. With issues as impactful on local 
communities as fracking, the dissent’s approach allows local ordinances to 
coexist with state law. Further, the dissent’s position provides those citizens 
most impacted by such environmentally disruptive drilling activities with a 
more effective avenue for regulating the operations of a company with a 
particularly strong influence within the state. 
I. LOCAL AND STATE REGULATIONS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY ADDRESSING BECK ENERGY’S RIGHT TO DRILL 
On February 16, 2011, Beck Energy Corporation (“Beck Energy”) se-
cured a permit from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (“ODNR”), 
Division of Mineral Resources Department, to drill a conventional gas well 
in Munroe Falls.14 Beck Energy received the state permit through Ohio’s 
Revised Code (“R.C.”) Chapter 1509, which provides uniform statewide 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Id. at 139 (O’Donnell, J., concurring). Munroe Falls’ argument emphasized that Ohio’s 
drilling regulations did not completely divest municipalities of their rights to enact and enforce 
zoning laws, and that their zoning ordinances could coexist with state law. Brief for Appellant, 
supra note 3, at *12–14. Munroe Falls also argued that its local drilling laws do not conflict with 
the state law in any meaningful way because they are grounded in educating the public as to the 
safety of the project and do not substantively impede the driller’s operations. Id. at *29. 
 11 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 132. 
 12 Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 99; see infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 13 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 137, 138. 
 14 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp. (Beck I), 989 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2013). 
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regulation of oil and gas production within Ohio.15 Beck Energy’s state 
permit required compliance with a number of conditions related to the drill-
ing site’s location within an “Urbanized Area” as well as its designation as a 
“Municipal Wellhead Protection Area.”16 Despite complying with the state 
regulations outlined in R.C. Chapter 1509, Beck Energy’s operation failed 
to comply with a number of municipal ordinances related to streets and 
rights-of-way, excavation, zoning, as well as oil and gas drilling.17 The City 
of Munroe Falls issued a Stop Work Order18 until such time when Beck En-
ergy complied with these local ordinances.19 Beck Energy, in response, ad-
vised the city that they did not intend to comply with this order.20 
A. R.C. Chapter 1509 
Ohio’s Revised Code Chapter 1509 regulates all oil and gas drilling 
and production operations in Ohio.21 In 2004, the Ohio General Assembly 
amended R.C. Chapter 1509.02 to give the Division of Mineral Resources 
Management of the ODNR the “sole and exclusive authority to regulate the 
permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas wells and production opera-
tions.”22 Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 1509.05, a person or company must first 
obtain a drilling permit from the Division of Mineral Resources Manage-
ment before drilling a well for oil or gas in Ohio.23 In order to obtain a per-
mit, a person or company must comply with a number of standards relating 
to well spacing restrictions, “safety of well drilling and operation, protec-
tion of the public and private water supply, fencing and screening of surface 
facilities, waste containment and disposal, construction of access roads, and 
noise mitigation.”24 
Although R.C. Chapter 1509 gives Ohio’s state government central au-
thority to regulate oil and gas drilling and production operations, it pre-
serves certain regulatory powers granted to local governments by other stat-
utes.25 Municipal corporations have the authority to control public high-
                                                                                                                           
 15 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp. (Beck II), 37 N.E.3d 128, 131 (Ohio 2015); see 
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013); supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 16 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 132. An “Urbanized area” is a municipal corporation or township 
with a population of 5000 or more. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.01. 
 17 Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 94–95. 
 18 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 132. 
 19 Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 88. 
 20 Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at *1. 
 21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02; see also Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 131. 
 22 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 131 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013)). 
 23 Id. at 132; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.05 (West 2011) (outlining permitting 
requirements for drilling a well). 
 24 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 132; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.03 (West 2012). 
 25 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (“[n]othing in this section affects the authority granted to 
. . . local authorities in section R.C. 723.01 and R.C. 4513.34”). 
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ways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, public grounds, bridges, aque-
ducts, and viaducts.26 Further, local authorities and the Ohio Department of 
Transportation are given the authority to grant permits for oversized vehi-
cles to use the roads in their respective jurisdictions.27 Ohio’s Revised Code 
Chapter 1509.02, however, expressly forbids the local authorities from ex-
ercising these powers in a manner that “discriminates against, unfairly im-
pedes, or obstructs oil and gas activities and operations regulated under [the 
statute].”28 
B. The Munroe Falls Ordinances 
Beck Energy’s violation of five provisions outlined in the Munroe 
Falls Codified Ordinances was the city of Munroe Falls’ main complaint.29 
Municipal Code section 1163 was a general zoning ordinance that prohibit-
ed any construction or excavation without first obtaining a “zoning certifi-
cate” issued by the town’s municipal zoning inspector.30 The remaining four 
ordinances all related to the necessary conditions for receiving permission 
to drill for oil and gas within Munroe Falls, as articulated in Chapter 1329 
of the Munroe Falls Codified Ordinances.31 Any person who drilled for gas 
or oil in violation of any of the provisions outlined in Chapter 1329 of Mun-
roe Falls’ Municipal Code would be guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor 
and could face imprisonment of up to six months, a fine of not more than 
$1000, or both, with each day constituting a separate violation.32 
                                                                                                                           
 26 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (West 2002). 
 27 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.34 (West 2013). 
 28 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02. 
 29 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 132; see also infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 30 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 132. A person wishing to receive a zoning certificate in order to drill 
in Munroe Falls must first obtain a “conditional zoning certificate.” MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, CODE 
OF ORDINANCES § 1329.04 (1993). A conditional zoning certificate would only be approved after 
all conditions, stipulations, and safeguards approved by the municipal planning Commission and 
Council had been met. MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1163.02 (1995). 
 31  Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 133; see also MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 1329.03 (prohibiting drilling a well for oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon until compliance with all 
provisions within § 1329 and a conditional zoning certificate has been granted for a period of one 
year); MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1329.04 (requiring an applicant to pay an 
$800 application fee); MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1329.05 (requiring an 
applicant to schedule a public hearing at least three weeks prior to drilling and notify all property 
owners and residents within 1000 feet of wellhead); MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANC-
ES § 1329.06 (requiring an applicant to deposit $2000 to serve as a performance bond conditional 
upon compliance with § 1329, which shall be released upon compliance). 
 32 MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1329.99. 
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C. Home-Rule Power 
Article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution confers upon munici-
palities the “authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to 
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary, and other 
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”33 This Home 
Rule Amendment gives municipalities the “broadest possible powers of 
self-government in connection with all matters that are strictly local and do 
not conflict with general laws or impinge upon matters of state-wide nature 
or interest.”34 
Previously, the Supreme Court of Ohio established a three-part test for 
determining whether a municipality has exceeded its powers under the 
Home Rule Amendment.35 “A municipal ordinance must yield to a state 
statute if (1) the ordinance is an exercise of police power, rather than of lo-
cal self-government, (2) the statute is a general law,36 and (3) the ordinance 
is in conflict with the statute.”37 The Court in Beck employed this three-part 
analysis in determining that the ordinances in question did not constitute a 
valid exercise of Munroe Falls’ home-rule power.38 
D. Application of the Home Rule Amendment to Munroe Falls’ Municipal 
Ordinances by the Lower Courts 
On April 6, 2011, Munroe Falls filed a complaint in the Summit Coun-
ty Court of Common Pleas.39 The municipality sought to prevent Beck En-
ergy from engaging in drilling activities on Mr. Willingham’s property until 
the company complied with all relevant municipal ordinances and received 
the requisite permits to begin drilling.40 In reviewing the matter, the Court 
of Common Pleas entered a preliminary injunction on May 3, 2011 prohib-
iting Beck Energy from proceeding until such time as Beck Energy com-
                                                                                                                           
 33 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. 
 34 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 133 (quoting State ex rel. Hackley v. Edmonds, 80 N.E.2d 769, 773 
(Ohio 1948)). 
 35 Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967, 971 (Ohio 2008); see also 
Auxter v. Toledo, 183 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ohio 1962) (establishing the analytical framework for 
assessing violations of Ohio’s Home Rule Power). 
 36 General laws are those that operate uniformly throughout the state and that impose a rule of 
conduct on the state’s citizenry. Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass’n, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1378–79 
(Ohio 1980). To determine a general law, a statute must be part of a statewide legislative enact-
ment, apply equally to all parts of the state, set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations instead 
of just addressing the legislative power of a municipal corporation to create the requisite regula-
tions, and prescribe a rule of conduct on the citizens generally. Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 134. 
 37 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 133–34. 
 38 See id. 
 39 Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 89. 
 40 Id. 
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plied with all the relevant municipal ordinances.41 Both the Court of Com-
mon Pleas and the parties later agreed to convert the preliminary injunction 
into a permanent injunction so that Beck Energy could bring an immediate 
appeal.42 Beck Energy then appealed the Court of Common Pleas’ order to 
the Ninth District Court of Appeals of Ohio.43 
In an opinion written by Judge Mary Jane Trapp on February 6, 2013, 
the Ninth District affirmed the trial court’s decision that Beck Energy must 
comply with local street and road ordinances.44 The appellate court, howev-
er, reversed the trial court’s ruling regarding the zoning and drilling ordi-
nances.45 Specifically, the appellate court held that R.C. Chapter 1509 was a 
general law and that it preempted these local regulations because the ordi-
nances conflicted with the state’s general law in violation of Ohio’s Home 
Rule Amendment.46 On March 22, 2013, the City of Munroe Falls appealed 
the Court of Appeals’s decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.47 
II. A DIVIDED COURT: PREEMPTION V. SUPPLEMENTATION 
In a 4-3 opinion written by Justice Judith L. French, the Ohio Supreme 
Court upheld the Court of Appeals’s ruling that reversed the lower court’s 
grant of injunctive relief.48 Justice French supported the appeals court’s 
analysis that R.C. chapter 1509 was a general law because it was part of a 
comprehensive statewide legislative scheme, applied uniformly throughout 
the state, did not purport to grant or limit municipal legislative power to 
prescribe the given regulations, and prescribed a rule of conduct upon citi-
zens generally.49 The court also held that the Munroe Falls ordinances con-
flicted with the Ohio statute.50 The ordinances in question regulated the 
same subject matter as the state law—oil and gas drilling—and prohibited 
what the state law allowed—state-licensed oil and gas production in Mun-
roe Falls.51 Justice French noted that the City of Munroe Falls viewed its 
ordinances as an exercise of police power rather than local self-
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. 
 42 Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at *2. 
 43 Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 89; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at *2. 
 44 Beck I, 989 N.E.2d at 85, 99. 
 45 Id. at 99. 
 46 Id. at 96–99. 
 47 Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at appendix 1. 
 48 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp. (Beck II), 37 N.E.3d 128, 138 (Ohio 2015). 
 49 Id. at 134, 135. 
 50 Id. at 135. 
 51 Id. 
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government.52 Consequently, the court upheld the appeals court’s decision 
that the ordinances must yield to R.C. 1509.02.53 
In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment only, Justice Terrence 
O’Donnell emphasized the narrow scope of the court’s ruling, which was 
limited to the five municipal ordinances at issue in the case. 54  Justice 
O’Donnell reasoned that the four ordinances related to the operation of oil 
and gas wells within Munroe Falls precluded drilling without first obtaining 
a permit from the city.55 Consequently, complying with the requisite munic-
ipal regulations established a parallel municipal permitting process for oil 
and gas that conflicted with the conditions outlined in Ohio’s Revised Code 
chapter 1509, a general state law.56 Justice O’Donnell then concluded that 
the state statute also preempted the Munroe Falls ordinance that required a 
conditional use certificate before drilling.57 Even though this ordinance re-
lated to zoning, an area traditionally reserved for municipal regulation, it 
functioned to regulate drilling by incorporating the same parallel permitting 
scheme that is applicable only to oil and gas wells before granting a condi-
tional use certificate.58 
Justice O’Donnell stressed that the court’s decision did not address 
whether Ohio’s oil and gas drilling law conflicted with local land use ordi-
nances that address only traditional concerns of zoning laws.59 Moreover, 
Justice O’Donnell further articulated that the court should confer a “strong 
presumption” in upholding the validity of a zoning ordinance.60 Revised 
Code chapter 1509 was enacted to preempt inconsistent local health and 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Id. at 134. Further, the court noted: “Our precedent is clear on this point. ‘[A]ny municipal 
ordinance which prohibits the doing of something without a municipal license to do it, is a police 
regulation’ within the meaning of the Home Rule Amendment.” Id. (quoting Auxter v. Toledo, 
183 N.E.2d 920 (Ohio 1962)). 
 53 Id. at 133, 138. 
 54 Id. at 138 (O’Donnell, J., concurring). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1509.02, 1509.05 (West 2013) (requiring entity to 
comply with comprehensive, statewide drilling regulations before receiving a permit to operate); 
MUNROE FALLS, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 1133.03 (requiring entity to have a conditional use 
certificate that could only be obtained by complying with municipal drilling regulations before 
being allowed to drill for oil or gas). 
 58 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 138 (O’Donnell, J., concurring). 
 59 Id. at 138–39. Justice O’Donnell noted that municipal authority to enact zoning ordinances 
that are not in conflict with general laws is inherent in Ohio’s Home Rule Amendment as well as 
R.C. chapter 713.07, which grants municipalities the statutory authority to regulate land uses with 
zoning districts to promote the public health, safety, convenience, comfort, propensity, and gen-
eral welfare. Id. at 138–39; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 713.07 (West 1953). 
 60 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 139 (O’Donnell, J., concurring) (citing Hudson v. Albrecht Inc., 458 
N.E.2d 852 (1984)); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.51 (West 1971) (“If a general provision 
conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is 
given to both . . . .”). 
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safety regulations governing the technical aspects of drilling, and nothing in 
the law expressly addressed zoning. 61  Therefore, according to Justice 
O’Donnell, the issue of whether R.C. chapter 1509 preempted all local zon-
ing ordinances limiting land uses to certain zoning districts without regulat-
ing the details of oil or gas drilling was left undecided by the court.62 
Although three justices wrote separate dissenting opinions, each justice 
disagreed with the holding that the Munroe Falls zoning ordinances actually 
conflicted with the state statute.63 Justice Paul E. Pfeifer emphasized that 
R.C. chapter 1509 leaves room for municipalities to employ local zoning 
ordinances.64 He reasoned that, by allowing municipal regulation to sup-
plement the state law, the General Assembly recognized that a big picture 
approach with local input was the most effective model for the sustainable 
development of Ohio’s natural resources.65 Justice William M. O’Neill ar-
ticulated that this decision “unceremoniously” stripped local control of 
drilling-location decisions from the citizens of Ohio.66 He further criticized 
the decision on the grounds that it provided local authorities with little re-
course for attempting to regulate oil and gas drilling within their borders.67 
Justice Judith Ann Lazinger stated that the local zoning ordinances and R.C. 
chapter 1509 had distinct legislative purposes that presented dual conditions 
to the operation of the oil and gas industry.68 
Justice Lazinger acknowledged that, although R.C. chapter 1509.02 
grants broad authority to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources 
(“ODNR”) to regulate the operations of oil and wells within the state, its 
preemption statement was alone insufficient to create a conflict or dispos-
sess municipalities of their home-rule authority.69 Moreover, the construc-
tion of R.C. chapter 1509.02 does not expressly take away any municipal 
zoning authority, nor does the statute expressly prohibit supplemental, non-
conflicting local regulation.70 
Justice Lazinger emphasized that the distinct legislative intents behind 
the state and local regulations further demonstrated that there was no con-
                                                                                                                           
 61 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 140, 141 (O’Donnell, J., concurring). 
 62 Id. at 138–39. 
 63 Id. at 141 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); id. at 141 (Lazinger, J., dissenting); see id. at 147 
(O’Neill J., dissenting). 
 64 Id. at 141 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 147 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 144 (Lazinger, J., dissenting). 
 69 Id. at 142. Both Justices O’Neill and Pfeifer joined Justice Lazinger’s dissent. Id. at 141 
(Pfeifer, J., dissenting); id. at 147 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
 70 Id. at 142 (Lazinger, J., dissenting). 
48 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:E. Supp. 
flict between the two.71 Munroe Falls’ ordinances demonstrated an exercise 
of local police power to promote health, safety, and general welfare of the 
public, and R.C. chapter 1509.02 had the distinct purpose to regulate meth-
ods of producing oil and gas statewide.72 According to Justice Lazinger’s 
dissent, the appeals court struck down the municipal ordinances without 
considering the possibility that they supplemented rather than supplanted 
state regulation.73 Consequently, Justice Lazinger suggested that she would 
remand the case to the appellate court with the instruction to examine 
whether Munroe Falls’ city ordinances could “stand separate and apart” 
from Ohio’s oil and gas regulations.74 Moreover, Justice Lazinger advocated 
that Ohio should make an effort to avoid preemption of the laws of local 
municipalities whenever possible, and that there is no need for the state to 
exercise exclusive authority over the oil and gas industry without leaving 
some authority of home rule to municipalities.75 
III. THE DANGERS OF RIGID APPLICATION OF PREEMPTION  
OVER MUNICIPAL REGULATION AND ITS IMPACT  
ON MUNICIPAL RESIDENTS 
Justice O’Neill’s dissent astutely described chapter 1509 of Ohio’s Re-
vised Code as creating “[a] zookeeper to feed the elephant in the living 
room.”76 Fracking and natural gas companies represent a powerful influence 
on statewide politics.77 R.C. Chapter 1509 and the subsequent Ohio Su-
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at 143 (“The General Assembly knows how to specifically prohibit the enforcement of 
local zoning ordinances as part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative scheme . . . R.C. 
Chapter 1509 has no similar language.”). 
 72 Id. at 144. Further, Justice Lazinger noted that “[n]o court has yet examined whether these 
city ordinances can stand separate and apart as zoning regulations that supplement the state regula-
tory scheme.” Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. Justice Lazinger then emphasized that other jurisdictions have expressly determined that 
local zoning ordinances do not conflict with state regulation of the oil and gas industry, and such 
local ordinances can coexist with state law. Id.; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La Plata City v. 
Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1059–60 (Colo. 1992) (holding that Colorado’s Oil and 
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city’s home-rule authority did not permit the city to ban all oil and gas development, home rule 
power allowed such regulation as could be harmonized with the state’s Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act); Wallach v. Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1202–03 (N.Y. 2014) (holding that statewide Oil, Gas 
and Mining Law did not preempt municipalities’ home rule authority to regulate land use); Hunt-
ley & Huntley, Inc. v. Oakmont Borough Council, 964 A.2d 866, 869 (Pa. 2009) (holding that 
local zoning restrictions on oil and gas drilling in residential districts was not preempted by state 
statute that superseded all municipal ordnances regulating oil and gas operations). 
 75 Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 146 (Lazinger, J., dissenting). 
 76 Id. at 147 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
 77 See generally Aaron Marshall, Ohio’s Oil and Gas Industry Emerging as a Big Player in 
the Political Process, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 9, 2012, http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/
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preme Court opinion in Beck Energy Corporation granted a state agency 
seemingly exclusive authority to regulate drilling for oil and gas.78 This sys-
tem will almost certainly have a favorable impact on the drilling operations 
of natural gas companies while failing to allow local municipalities to exer-
cise concurrent authority to regulate gas and oil drilling within their bor-
ders.79 Given the potentially devastating effects that drilling for oil or gas 
can have on a local environment, individual citizens should have some form 
of control over regulating such an activity. 80  Consequently, the courts 
should be reluctant to cede absolute authority to the state regulatory agen-
cies for such a locally impactful activity, particularly when municipal regu-
lations can be read to supplement general law rather than conflict with it.81 
Additional regulations can allow a municipality to prevent drilling in certain 
zoning designations within their borders and can provide additional safe-
guards for this inherently dangerous activity.82 
Justice French’s majority opinion fails to consider whether municipal 
authority can supplement the broad and exclusive authority of the state to 
regulate oil and gas production within the municipality’s own borders.83 
Instead, Justice French rigidly finds a conflict between the local ordinances 
                                                                                                                           
04/ohios_oil_and_gas_industry_eme.html [http://perma.cc/3Q4R-22YZ] (describing the impact of 
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wells are now operational in Ohio, producing 5.6 million barrels of oil and 222 billion cubic feet 
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 78 See Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 146 (Lazinger, J., dissenting) (“There is no need for the state to 
act as the thousand-pound gorilla, gobbling up exclusive authority over the oil and gas industry, 
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 79 See id. at 147 (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (“What the drilling industry has bought and paid for 
in campaign contributions it shall receive.”). 
 80 See id. Oil and gas drilling operations require a variety of toxic chemicals and have been 
known to produce large volumes of toxic waste. Brief for City of Munroe Falls as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants at 5–6, Ohio ex rel Morrison v. Beck Energy Co., (2013), 2013 WL 5229894, 
at *4-5. Natural gas drilling also poses high risks of explosions and fire. Id. Moreover, such opera-
tions can contaminate water and lead to local air and noise pollution. Id. at *6. Moreover, the frack-
ing procedure of wastewater disposal into deep wells has been determined to increase the risk of 
earthquakes in the surrounding area, and such operations have even been linked to an earthquake in 
Youngstown, Ohio, less than an hour west of Munroe Falls. Sean Rigby, Earthquake Litigation Shak-
ing Up the Fracking Industry, GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE (Feb. 4, 2015), http://gelr.org/
2015/02/27/earthquake-litigation-shaking-up-the-fracking-industry-georgetown-international-environ-
mental-law-review [http://perma.cc/LX6B-D8H3]. 
 81 See Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 141 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 82 See id. at 147 (O’Neill, J., dissenting) (“Under this ruling, a drilling permit could be grant-
ed in the exquisite residential neighborhoods of Upper Arlington, Shaker Heights, or the village of 
Indian Hill—local zoning dating back to 1920 be damned.”); see also infra note 86 and accompa-
nying text. 
 83 See generally Beck II, 37 N.E.3d at 131 (plurality opinion). 
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and the state law because they prohibit what the state law allows.84 If this 
were the only consideration to preempt local regulation, then even tradi-
tional zoning ordinances would be unable to prevent the drilling of gas or 
oil in otherwise residential areas if the state granted a permit for drilling on 
property within that zone.85 Moreover, Justice French’s second considera-
tion that R.C. chapter 1509.02 almost automatically preempts any form of 
local regulation over activities related to oil or gas within a municipality’s 
borders appears to not only act contradictory to the interests of Ohio citi-
zens, but also presents a dangerous precedent for future home-rule analy-
sis.86 Moreover, although Justice French admits that the court’s holding is 
limited to the five municipal ordinances at issue in the case, she does so 
almost as an aside, and the reasoning employed in the decision could have 
broad implications moving forward.87 Although it might be hyperbolic to 
state that a plurality opinion could theoretically allow Ohio to grant drilling 
permits in traditionally residential areas, the plurality’s reasoning has the 
possibility to establish such a precedent.88 
In his concurring opinion, Justice O’Donnell emphasized the limited 
scope of the court’s holding, suggesting that Munroe Falls could potentially 
have regulated Beck Energy’s operations through zoning authority tradi-
tionally granted to municipalities.89 His concurrence with the majority rest-
ed on the position that the ordinances in question created a redundant per-
mitting process that was parallel to the related state law, and were thus 
preempted; however, this opinion articulated a more cogent, narrow inter-
pretation of preemption in R.C. chapter 1509 and its interaction with areas 
of traditional local authority.90 
Each of the three dissenting opinions justly lamented the restriction of 
local authority regarding oil and gas operations within their boundaries.91 
The majority’s reasoning clumsily threatens to grant the state exclusive au-
thority in regulating activity related to oil and gas drilling, and it was ap-
propriate for the dissenting justices to point out the dangers of the decision 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See id. at 135. 
 85 See id. at 147 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
 86 See id. at 142 (Lazinger, J., dissenting) (quoting Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. Cleveland, 858 
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 87 See id. at 137 (plurality opinion). 
 88 See id. at 147 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
 89 See id. at 141 (O’Donnell, J., concurring). 
 90 See id. at 138. 
 91 See id. at 141 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); id. at 144, 148 (Lazinger, J., dissenting); id. at 149 
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in their opinions.92 It is noteworthy that there was a clear conflict in the par-
allel permitting process created by the similarity between the state and local 
regulations.93 However, the recurring theme present within the dissenting 
opinions and in the concurring opinion is that there should be some room 
left for municipalities to exercise concurrent authority over local land use 
that supplemented state regulation. 94  Ultimately, the constitutional and 
statutory authority for municipalities to regulate oil and gas drilling through 
traditional zoning laws seems to be the most logical avenue for municipali-
ties to address local concerns presented by such activity without directly 
conflicting with the statutory authority granted to state agencies.95 
CONCLUSION 
The Munroe Falls ordinances attempted to grant those most impacted 
by local drilling activities more control in drilling-location decisions. How-
ever, the means employed to accomplish this purpose conflicted with Ohio’s 
Home Rule Amendment as well as the provisions articulated in R.C. Chap-
ter 1509, Ohio’s oil and gas statute. The ordinances created a parallel per-
mitting process that Beck Energy Corporation had to comply with before 
beginning drilling operations. However, in its rigid conflict analysis, the 
plurality opinion in Beck Energy threatens to establish a dangerous prece-
dent that could have devastating effects for the exercise of any local au-
thority over oil and gas drilling in the state of Ohio. Given the impact that 
oil and gas drilling has on a local environment and its residents, the Court 
should attempt to find an appropriate balance so that municipal regulations 
can supplement state law moving forward. 
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